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NEPA-THE PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE
DUTY TO DISCUSS ALTERNATIVES
On June 14, 1971, President Nixon, in anticipation of a possible
energy crisis, directed the Secretary of the Department of the Interior
to offer for lease land on the Outer Continental Shelf for offshore
oil drilling.1 In response to the President's action, the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Friends of the Earth, and the Sierra Club
sought and obtained an injunction barring the proposed lease be-
cause the Department had failed to discuss some alternatives to the
proposed action, had only superficially discussed others, and had not
discussed the environmental impact of any of the alternatives in its
environmental impact statement as required by the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) .2
1. 117 CONG. Rlc. 18049-53 (1971) (President's Energy Message).
2. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 165
(D.D.C. 1971). The National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)
(1969), states in part that all agencies of the federal government shall-
(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the
integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental de-
sign arts in planning and decisionmaking which may have an impact on
mares environment;
(B) ....
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation
and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would
be involved in the proposed action should the plan be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement the responsible Federal official shall
consult with and obtain comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdic-
tion by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact
involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of appro-
priate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop
and enforce environmental standards, shall be made available to the Presi-
dent, the Council on Environmental Quality, and to the Public as provided
by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany the proposal through the
existing agency review process;
(D) study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended
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In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,3 the court
of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling, focusing on the scope
of the duty to discuss alternatives to the proposed action in the im-
pact statement.4 In response to the court of appeals decision that the
Department's impact statement did not conform to the mandate of
NEPA, the Department of the Interior prepared an addendum to its
statement discussing the alternatives to the proposed lease in detail.
The district court, however, refused to dissolve the injunction, stat-
ing that the Department had not circulated the addendum to other
concerned agencies for comment, as required by section 102 (2) (C)
of NEPA.5
Section 102 (2) (C) requires that an environmental impact state-
ment be prepared for all major federal actions significantly affecting
the environment and that the impact statement include a discussion
of the alternatives to the proposed action.6 The court of appeals in
Morton directed its attention to the required comprehensiveness of
the agency's discussion of these alternatives and their environmental
impact." Relying primarily on congressional intent, the court stated
that the impact statement was designed to provide Congress, the
executive branch, and the federal agencies with a basis for evaluating
the environmental consequences of the proposed action, and addition-
ally, to provide a comparison of the consequences of this action with
the environmental risks presented by alternative courses of action.8
With this congressional mandate in mind, the court broadly con-
strued the agency's obligation under section 102 (2) (C) (iii) of NEPA
to discuss alternatives. This broad interpretation is evidenced by the
most significant aspect of the Morton decision, the court's response
to the Secretary of the Interior's contention that the statement need
not discuss those alternatives which require congressional action to
courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concern-
ing alternative uses of available resources;(E) recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental
problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States,
lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed
to maximize international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline
in the quality of mankind's world environment.
3. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
4. Id.
5. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 337 F. Supp. 170
(D,D.C. 1972).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1969).
7. 458 F.2d at 834.
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initiate, specifically, the alternative of increasing the energy supply
by lifting import quotas on foreign produced oil. The court stated
that even if an alternative was beyond the agency's power to imple-
ment, it must be included in the impact statement because the state-
ment was intended to be circulated to the executive branch and to
Congress since each may have the power to initiate the alternative
course of action.9 The court stated that even if a prior legislative
determination had been made concerning import quotas, the agency
was not precluded from including this alternative in the impact
statement because Congress contemplated that there be a continuing
review of these decisions in NEPA.o Because of this continuing re-
view process, the court found that Congress did not intend a full
discussion of alternatives which are remote or speculative, especially
if they require basic changes in statutes and policies. NEPA, the
court concluded, did not require a "crystal ball" inquiry.1
The court stated that it was the essence of NEPA that the statement
serve to gather in one place a discussion of the relative environmental
impacts of the alternatives,2 but the court also suggested that in addi-
tion to the discussion of the environmental impact, the agency must
include a weighing of economics, foreign policy, and national security
when pertinent to a comparative evaluation of alternatives28 The
court concluded that the discussion must be sufficient to permit a
reasonable choice of alternatives, and that an alternative must not
be excluded from the impact statement because it does not offer a
complete solution to the problem.14
In Morton the court not only re-examined, but reaffirmed the
breadth of the NEPA requirement to discuss alternatives.', When
8. Id. at 833.
9. Id. at 834 n.15; note that the President did suspend oil import quotas as
of May 1, 1973. Exec. Order No. 11,712, 3 C.F.R. - (Supp. 1973).
10. 458 F.2d at 836. See also Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v.
Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which held that even if Congress au-
thorized and appropriated for a nuclear test on Amchitka Island it did not bar
a judicial inquiry into the sufficiency of the agency's impact statement.
11. 458 F.2d at 837.
12. Id. at 834. See also 1 A. REIGTER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 102-05 (1972)
for a general discussion on including foreign policy considerations in the impact
statement.
13. 458 F.2d at 837.
14. Id.
15. THmD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY
243 (1972) [hereinafter cited as THmD ANNUAL REPORT].
Washington University Open Scholarship
ALTERNATIVES TO NEPA
studied in light of congressional intent and prior judicial decisions,
Morton provides a relatively comprehensive guide to the alternative
aspect of section 102 (2) (C) statements. Even though Morton may be
limited in its general application by the unusually wide implications
of the facts of the case, evidenced by the significance of lifting oil
import quotas on economics and foreign policy, the decision provides
agencies with a clear judicial guide as to how comprehensive their
discussion of alternatives must be. Congress made it clear that NEPA
was to be complied with in the strictest sense, that no agency was to
"utilize an excessively narrow construction of its statutory authoriza.
tions to avoid compliance,"'6L and further directed the agencies to
"develop information and provide descriptions of alternatives in
adequate detail for subsequent reviewers and decisionmakers, both
within the executive branch and Congress."'1 Having termed NEPA
an environmental "full disclosure law,"'18 Congress clearly contem-
plated a discussion of alternatives to the "fullest extent possible."19
Morton provides a concrete example of what Congress meant by
"action forcing and full disclosure procedure."'20
Since the inception of NEPA, courts have played a significant role
in the Act's enforcement and interpretation, even though the court's
duties are limited to insuring procedural compliance with NEPA.21
Considering the vast amount of litigation concerning NEPA,2 2 it
16. U.S. CODE CONG. & Arm. NEWS, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2770 (1969).
17. 115 CoNo. R:c. 40420 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson). See also S.
REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (report of the Committee on In-
terior and Insular Affairs) for a general discussion of the overall congressional
intent of NEPA.
18. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749,
759 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
19. 115 CoNG. REc. 40418 (1969) (remarks of Senator Jackson). Congress
intended that the language "to the fullest extent possible" apply to all of §
102(2) of NEPA. Id.
20. 115 CONG. REc. 19010 (1969) (report of the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs).
21. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109,
1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Courts have consistently held that NEPA requirements
provide only procedural remedies instead of substantive rights. The function of
the court is to insure that the requirements are met, and therefore the court can-
not substitute its opinion as to whether the project should be undertaken or not.
For a discussion of the court's general role in environmental litigation see J. SAX,
DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1971).
22. According to 18 PRAc. LAW. 78, 82 (May 1972) [hereinafter cited as 18
PkAc. LAW.], since 1970 NEPA has generated 2,500 environmental impact
statements, 47 federal district court decisions and 3 Supreme Court dissents.
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is surprising that Morton is the first detailed analysis of section
102 (2) (C) (iii). Earlier decisions dealt more with other aspects of
section 102 (2) (C) or with the general purposes behind the alterna-
tive requirement, rather than with the actual content of the alterna-
tive aspect of the impact statement. As a result, the question of the
extent to which the agency must discuss the alternatives to the pro-
posed action was an area of generally unsettled case law when the
issue was presented to the court in Morton.
In Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC,23 the court
reaffirmed the congressional mandate that alternatives must be dis-
cussed to the "fullest extent possible" so that the decision maker has
before him all possible approaches to the proposed action. 24 In re-
viewing the adequacy of the AEC's guidelines for implementing
NEPA, the court did not limit the alternatives to be discussed,25 but
imposed on the agencies a "strict standard of compliance" with
NEPA.26 In Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engi-
neers,27 the court reiterated the rule of Calvert Cliff's, but extended
the agency's duty by requiring it to discuss the alternative of taking
no action at all in relation to a proposed project.28
Morton has both reaffirmed these prior decisions and expanded
them by discussing the "full disclosure" requirement in relation to
alternatives. 29 Morton makes it clear that all relevant considerations
are to be discussed, including those alternatives that require executive
or legislative implementation.30 Consequently, Morton has provided
a statement as to the comprehensiveness in which the alternatives to
the proposed action must be discussed.
One month after the Morton decision, a North Carolina district
court chose not to follow the broad construction of section 102 (2) (C)
23. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
24. Id.
25. 18 PRAc. LAW. 94.
26. 449 F.2d at 1114.
27. 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
28. Id. at 761. See also 115 CONG. REc. 40420 (1969) (remarks of Senator
Jackson) : "The language of section 102(2) (C) has been explained in the Senate
as requiring a discussion of the alternative ways of accomplishing the objectives
of the proposed action and the results of not accomplishing the proposed action."
29. Council on Environmental Quality Memorandum to Federal Agencies on
Procedures for Improving Impact Statements 85 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
CEQ Memorandum].
30. See 18 PRAO. LAW. 94.
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that the Morton court had relied on. In Conservation Council v.
Froehlke,"; the court construed NEPA to require that the impact
statement need only "identify" the alternatives. Plaintiff argued that
the Army Corps of Engineer's impact statement did not present a
complete analysis of alternatives to the proposed dam project. Hold-
ing that only a "mere identification" was necessary,32 the court did
not provide a definition of "identification" and relied on Committee
for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg 3 as precedent for this
standard. Seaborg required that the agency state opposing views when
analyzing the environmental effects of the proposed action.34 Identify-
ing opposing views to the proposed actions in Seaborg was stated not
in reference to the alternatives to be discussed, but in reference to
the various views concerning the proposed action. Even with this
possible misinterpretation of Seaborg on the part of the Froehlke
court, it appears that the two cases used different approaches in
analyzing section 102 (2) (C); Morton construing NEPA in light of
congressional intent, and Froehlke relying on unsettled case law.
Morton would agree with Froehlke only in that an alternative need
only be identified when it has little or no environmental impact. 35
The effect of this apparent inconsistency between the two federal
district courts has had a nominal effect on the credibility of Morton.
Assuming that the identification of alternatives precludes a full discus-
sion of such alternatives, Froehlke appears to be contrary to federal
regulations which require a "rigorous exploration and objective
evaluation of alternative actions,"6 and to congressional intent as
stated by Morton:
Congress contemplated that the Impact Statement would consti-
tute the environmental source material for the information of
the Congress as well as the Executive, in connection with the
making of relevant decisions .... The impact statement provides
a basis for (a) evaluation of the benefits of the proposed project
31. 340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D.N.C. 1972).
32. Id. at 227.
33. 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
34. Id.
35. 458 F.2d at 834. See also Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.
1972), where the court compared section 102(2) (0) (iii) with section 102(2) (D)
and concluded that section (D) is not limited to those alternatives significantly
affecting the environment but that section 102(2) (C) (iii) is so limited.
36. 35 Fed. Reg. 7390, 7392 (1970).
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in light of its environmental risks, and (b) comparison of the
net balance for the proposed project with the environmental risks
presented by alternative courses of action.37
The Council on Environmental Quality adhered to Morton when it
stated, after both decisions had been handed down, that the analysis
of alternatives must be "sufficiently detailed and rigorous to permit
independent evaluation of the benefits and costs and environmental
risks of the proposed action and each of the alternatives."as This
directive requires not a "mere identification" of alternatives, 0 but a
full evaluation of alternatives under section 102 (2) (C).
Some commentators fear that the discussion of non-environmental
factors will destroy the focus and go beyond the purpose of the Act.40
Other critics have argued that the Morton decision will not only re-
sult in delays in implementing the proposed project,41 and excessive
paper work,42 but the requirement to discuss the full range of alter-
natives will put a great burden on the decision maker because of the
necessity that he explore the consequences and balance the individual
alternatives now presented in detail in order to arrive at a decision.43
NEPA, however, was not intended to make the decision maker's
burden lighter; rather, its purpose was to add a new factor to his
decision-the environment. 44 Part of the "full disclosure and action
37. 458 F.2d at 833.
38. CEQ Memorandum at 85.
39. 340 F. Supp. at 227.
40. THImD ANNUAL REPORT at 245. See also 3 ERC 1374 (1972), where Bruce
Blanchard of the Department of the Interior Office of Environmental Project
Review states that requiring economic and social factors runs counter to in-
corporating environmental factors and early decision-making. He concludes that
the trend will be to turn the environmental impact statement into a justification
statement.
41. 3 ERG 521 (1972). According to the Senate Interior Committee, the im.
pact statement requirement has caused delays of up to one year in bringing power
plants into operation. Id. at 542. Richard Hills, assistant advisor on site problems
for the Federal Power Commission, states that the NEPA requirement that all
alternatives be discussed presents an untenable problem to planners. Id.
42. Id. at 592.
43. See 18 PRAc. LAW. 94.
44. Tnmm ANNUAL REPORT at 225. See also Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1971), where the
court stated:
At the very least, NEPA is an environmental full disclosure law. The Congress,
by enacting it, may not have intended to alter the then existing decision-
making responsibilities or to take away any then existing freedom of decision-
making, but it certainly intended to make such decisionmaking more respon-
sive and more responsible.
Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir.
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forcing process" 45 of NEPA is to insure that the decision maker is
aware of all known alternatives and their possible consequences at
the time the decision is made. 46 Critics may have overlooked the fact
that once the agency has complied with the procedural requirements
of NEPA the decision maker may choose to ignore the environmental
factors in the actual making of the decision.Y7
Although Congress did not intend the preparation of an impact
statement to cause delay in implementing the proposed project,48
such delay may be an incident to "full and good faith" compliance
with NEPA.49 As the court in Calvert Cliff's noted in refuting the
Atomic Energy Commission's contention that a discussion of the full
range of alternatives would unduly delay implementation of the
project: "It is far more consistent with the purposes of the Act to
delay operations at a stage where real environmental protection may
come about than at a stage where corrective action may be so costly
as to be impossible. 50 The court concluded that some delay was in-
herent in the full compliance with NEPA.51 In light of the purposes
of NEPA, any delay in the agency's attempt to comply with the Act
can hardly be considered undue or unnecessary.
The criticism that consideration of economics, foreign policy, and
national security consequences will destroy the focus of NEPA and
is contrary to congressional intent must be answered by considering
the factual context of Morton. Surely not every situation to which
NEPA applies will necessitate such a wide range of considerations as
did the oil import quota alternative in Morton. In such an unusually
broad problem these factors could easily be considered significant in
1971), stated that NEPA requires that the agencies consider environmental
issues.
45. 115 CONG. REc. 19010 (1969)(report of the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs).
46. Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
47. Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 340 F. Supp. 222, 225 (M.D.N.C.
1972); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759
(E.D. Ark. 1971).
48. U.S. CODE Co.NG. & ADm. NEws, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2769 (1969).
49. TamD ANNUAL REPORT at 253.
50. 449 F.2d at 1128. See also Boston Waterfront Residents Ass'n v. Romney,
343 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1972), which held that alternatives must be deter-
mined early in the planning of demolition of buildings because implementing the
rehabilitation alternative would be impossible once the buildings were razed.
51. 449 F.2d at 1128.
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a "rigorous exploration and objective evaluation" of an alternative,51
especially where the decision maker is to be provided with a full
discussion of all reasonable alternatives to the proposed plan. Morton
made it dear that these factors were to be discussed where relevant
in weighing an alternative,5 3 and the Council on Environmental
Quality has stated that:
A detailed discussion of each of these subjects could reqjuire as
much space as the environmental analysis itself, destroying the
focus of the statement and undercutting the purpose of NEPA.
What is necessary is a succinct explanation of the factors to be
balanced in reaching a decision, thus alerting the agency decision
maker, as well as the President, Congress and the public to the
nature of the interests that are being served at the expense of
environmental values.54
The court in Morton also pointed out that the essence of NEPA re-
mains that of considering the environmental impact of the proposed
action and the alternatives. 55
The most significant aspect of the Morton decision, the court's
conclusion that alternatives reasonably available to the Government
as a whole must be discussed, even if some of the alternatives are
outside the control of the agency, was adhered to by the Council of
Environmental Quality when it stated:
[Iln view of the importance of the Morton decision.., it seems
preferable to expand the reference to "alternatives" in agency
NEPA procedures at least to the extent of indicating that all rea-
sonable alternatives will be evaluated, even though they may not
be within the agency's control. 56
The duty of the courts under NEPA is to see that the purposes of
Congress are not lost or misdirected in the federal bureaucracy.57
Morton has insured that the agencies conform to the congressional
purpose behind the requirement to discuss alternatives to the pro.
posed action. The future viability of Morton and NEPA depends on
52. 35 Fed. Reg. 7390, 7392 (1970).
53. 458 F.2d at 834.
54. CEQ Memorandum at 85.
55. 458 F.2d at 834.
56. CEQ Memorandum at 85.
57. Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
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whether the strict enforcement of the Act as evidenced by Morton
will be sacrificed in an effort to halt the expanding energy crisis.
Hopefully the goals of NEPA will not be lost under the ever increas-
ing demand for new energy sources. Barring any congressional re-
vision of NEPA,s the courts will be faced with the dilemma of
whether or not to abdicate their strict adherence to NEPA in the
face of an energy crisis. Some courts have already yielded to the de-
mand for energy at the expense of the Act.59 Hopefully, environ-
mental considerations will continue to be a primary factor in decisions
like Morton that affect both our energy supply and our environment.
Steven Sunde
58. Leonard Birchwet, Staff Counsel of the Senate Commerce Committee,
states that Congress probably will not amend NEPA in 1973. 3 ERG 1374 (1972).
59. Alabama Gas Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 476 F.2d 142 (5th
Cir. 1973), held that the F.P.C.'s interim suspension order that approved the
pipeline company's curtailment of gas deliveries in order to protect natural gas
suppliers does not require an impact statement because the preparation of the
statement would violate the Commission's duty to act quickly to prevent gas
shortages.
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